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The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990:
Improving Judicial Determinations of Whether
an Individual is "Substantially Limited"
On July 26, 1990, President George Bush signed the Ameri-
cans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).1 One of the ADA's
stated purposes is to "provide a clear and comprehensive na-
tional mandate for the elimination of discrimination against in-
dividuals with disabilities." 2  The ADA seeks to eliminate
discrimination against disabled persons by granting them status
as a protected class for purposes of employment,3 transporta-
tion,4 public accommodations,5 and telecommunications serv-
ices.6 Due to its multi-title structure, the ADA will take effect
between July 26, 1991 and July 26, 1992.
Whether a disability exists will be a threshold issue in
every action brought under the ADA. Under the ADA, an in-
dividual is considered disabled,8 and therefore a member of the
protected class, if the individual satisfies one of three tests.
The "current" test requires a plaintiff to show that she has a
physical or mental impairment that currently substantially
limits her performance of some major life activity, such as car-
1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 134 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 11 (extra ed. July
16, 1990) (to be reported at 104 Stat. 327 (1990)) [hereinafter ADA].
2. ADA, supra note 1, § 2(b)(1) (emphasis added). Not only is the ADA's
purpose broad and remedial, but also it is designed to provide clear and ascer-
tainable standards to which parties may look in addressing discrimination
against persons with disabilities. IM § 2(b)(2). Legal commentators have
called the ADA "a comprehensive piece of civil rights legislation that will es-
tablish far-reaching, and at times costly, obligations." Fagin, McAvoy &
Dorman, New Federal Legislation Creates Challenges, Benefits for Business,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 3, 1990, at 18.
3. ADA, supra note 1, §§ 101-108 (Title I).
4. Id §§ 201-246 (Title H).
5. Id. §§ 301-310 (Title I).
6. Id. §§ 401-402 (Title IV).
7. The ADA protects only those persons who prove that they are dis-
abled. See infra note 37.
8. The ADA defines "disability" with respect to an individual as follows:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
ADA, supra note 1, § 3(2).
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ing for one's self, performing manual tasks, learning and work-
ing.9 The "record of" test requires a plaintiff to show that she
was at one time so limited.10 The "regarded as" test requires
the plaintiff to show that a party covered by the ADA either
perceives or treats her as being so limited.": Determining
whether the ADA protects an individual thus depends in large
part on the definition of "substantially limits."' 2 Unfortu-
nately, this phrase is neither defined in the statute' 3 nor sus-
ceptible to a simple common sense definition.' 4 Additionally,
9. Non-discrimination on the Basis of Handicap Guidelines, 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1989). The regulations also list other life activities: walking,
seeing, hearing, breathing, speaking. Id The Department of Health & Human
Services, then Health, Education & Welfare, promulgated the regulations to
effectuate the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, including the definition of
"individual with handicaps." These life activities likely will be part of the
ADA.
10. ADA, supra note 1, § 3(2)(B). For a previous explication of the "rec-
ord of" test, see 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iii) (1989).
11. ADA, supra note 1, § (3)(2)(C). For an explication of the intricacies of
this test, see 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv) (1989).
12. Although this Note does not focus on employment suits under the
ADA, such suits will be a major part of litigation under the ADA. In suits aris-
ing in the employment context, a plaintiff's ability to show that she is a "quali-
fied individual with a disability," will determine whether she can gain
protection under the ADA. ADA, supra note 1, § 102(a). A person will be con-
sidered a "qualified individual with a disability" if she can show that with or
without reasonable accommodation, she can perform the essential functions of
the employment position at issue. Id § 101(8). Discussion of "reasonable ac-
commodation" is beyond the scope of this Note; the ADA states the relevant
principle in §§ 101(9)(A)-(B).
13. See infra Part I. A.
14. The wide variety of impairments alone makes it difficult to define
"substantially limits" using common meanings. At issue here is the distinction
between "classic" and "non-classic" impairments. Individuals with conditions
like paraplegia, total blindness, deafness, severe cerebral palsy, Down's Syn-
drome, amputation of limbs, and cancer testified at the hearings of the con-
gressional committees considering the ADA. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 4-5 (1989). These conditions can be described as classic impairments,
those that come to mind when a person is asked to think of a disability.
Additionally, the permanent and total effects that usually result from
such impairments mean that they likely are considered impairments that
"substantially limit" a major life activity, no matter how that phrase is inter-
preted. Thus, such impairments are prototypical statutory disabilities. For ex-
ample, some impairments seem to fit clearly under the definition's "current"
test: total blindness, deafness, paralysis. Others clearly fit under the "record
of" test: cancer, heart disease, existing records of mental retardation. Still
others clearly fit under the "regarded as" test: a person with a limp or tic who
is perceived to have severe cerebral palsy. Indeed, these are conditions present
in cases under the Federal Rehabilitation Act in which parties have stipulated
that the plaintiff is handicapped. For examples of such stipulations see infra
note 59 and accompanying text.
Although Congress may primarily have contemplated classic impairments
1304 [Vol. 75:1303
DISABILITIES LAW
existing federal law fails to provide a clear definition.' 5
This Note attempts to provide guidance to courts that will
face the question of whether an individual is "substantially lim-
ited in a major life activity" and thus disabled within the mean-
ing of the ADA. Part I examines the ADA's text and
legislative history. Part II considers the meaning given the
phrase under the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (FRA).16
Because the FRA is the source of the ADA's definition of disa-
bility, it may provide important insight on the meaning of the
phrase in the ADA. Part III proposes a standard and a set of
factors for determining whether a given impairment has the
requisite severity to be considered "substantially limiting." Part
III then demonstrates how this proposed analytical method will
aid courts' determinations of disability under the ADA, particu-
larly under the major life activity of "working."
I. "SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITS" AND THE ADA
A. TEXT OF THE ADA
The text of the ADA provides little guidance for determin-
ing the meaning of "substantially limits." It merely defines the
term "disability" and states that the definition applies through-
out the Act.' 7 The legislation does refer to specific conditions
and impairments, but, with one exception,' 8 does so only to ex-
pressly exclude them from consideration as disabilities.' 9 Be-
when passing the ADA, other impairments exist that initially do not seem the
same as the above conditions. Depression, war trauma syndrome, dyslexia,
obesity, blindness in one eye, ruptured disks, etc. are conditions that can be
termed "non-classic" impairments. Unlike classic impairments, these condi-
tions do not intuitively suggest that an individual is disabled.
The more an individual's impairment moves away from classic impair-
ments, the more standards of severity and methods of analysis are needed to
determine whether an impairment "substantially limits" a major life activity.
Without such standards and analysis, there is a greater risk that the ADA sup-
porters' desired breadth and uniformity will not occur.
15. See infra Part II.
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-795 (1988). Like the ADA, the FRA was designed to
provide employment opportunities to disabled persons. See infra notes 38-40
and accompanying text.
17. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (providing the definition).
18. The ADA expressly provides that persons who have successfully com-
pleted rehabilitation from drug use, are participating in a supervised drug re-
habilitation program and are not engaging in illegal drug use, or are
erroneously regarded as engaging in illegal drug use, cannot be excluded from
consideration as an individual with a disability. ADA, supra note 1,
§ 510(b)(1)-(3).
19. Homosexuality and bisexuality are not considered to be impairments.
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cause the statute does not provide a rationale for excluding the
conditions, the list of exclusions does not assist courts trying to
interpret what Congress intended to include as a disability. In
addition, the legislative history does not indicate why the condi-
tions were excluded, nor how these excluded conditions pertain
to any element of the definition.20
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The legislative history of the ADA, unlike its express lan-
guage, does provide some guidance on Congress's meaning of
the phrase "substantially limits." Congress adopted the defini-
tion of disability from the earlier FRA.21 Nevertheless, there
was no consensus on the meaning of the definition in the ADA.
For example, congressional floor debate evidences disagree-
ment on what the definition meant and whom it would cover.2
Id. § 511(a). The ADA also provides that "disability" does not include trans-
vestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity
disorders not arising from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior dis-
orders, id, § 511(b)(1); compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania, id.
§ 511(b)(2); or psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current use
of drugs, id. § 511(b)(3). It is unclear if Congress considered the excluded con-
ditions to lie outside the purposes of the ADA. The rest of the ADA is silent
on the issue of who is or is not disabled, except to say that nothing in the
ADA, "shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards ap-
plied under Title V of the... [FRA] ... or the regulations issued by Federal
agencies pursuant to such Title." Id. § 501(a).
20. See supra note 19.
21. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 14, at 21 ("the definition of the term 'disa-
bility' is comparable to" the FRA definition).
22. In the Senate, opponents and supporters disagreed over the parame-
ters of the definition. Senator Helms, an opponent of the ADA, engaged Sena-
tor Harkin, the sponsor of the ADA, in a colloquy over various disorders that
would or would not be included in the ADA. 135 CONG. REC. S10,765 (daily ed.
Sept. 7, 1989). Helms implied that the definition was very loose and would be
an endless source of litigation. Id.; see also 135 CONG. REC. S10,742 (daily ed.
Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Senator Pryor) (unless the definition is tightened,
the ADA might create a "lawyer's mecca"); 135 CONG. REC. S10,772 (daily ed.
Sept. 7, 1989) (statements of Senators Armstrong and Helms) (the definition is
"broad" and "vague").
Commentators also have disagreed on the meaning of the definition. See
Haines, E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall: A Penetrating Interpretation of "Handi-
capped Individual"for Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
and for Various State Equal Employment Opportunity Statutes, 16 LoY.
L.A.L. REV. 527, 530 (1983) (arguing that despite administrative regulations ex-
plaining the definition, ambiguities remain); Comment, The Rehabilitation Act
of 1973: Who is Handicapped Under Federal Law, 16 U.S.F. L. REV. 653, 675-
76 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, Rehabilitation Act of 1973] (arguing that
"substantial" is synonymous with "actual" or "real"); Comment, What's a
Handicap Anyway? Analyzing Handicap Claims Under the Rehabilitation
[Vol. 75:13031306
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In the House of Representatives, supporters of the ADA consid-
ered the definition to be both clear and consistent with the pur-
poses of the ADA. Representative Bartlett, manager of the
ADA in the House, expressly stated that the definition com-
ported with the broad purposes of the ADA because it man-
dated a "functional" analysis, not a medical conclusion.m
Opponents of the ADA, in contrast, found the lack of specificity
regarding impairments to be troubling. To them, the defini-
tion's broad scope would result in the definition being "a fertile
hunting ground for litigious people in our society to expand the
definition.'' 4
The reports of the relevant congressional committees pro-
vide considerably more certainty as to the meaning of "substan-
tially limits."25 The report of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources,26 the committee responsible for devel-
oping the structure of the ADA, most clearly indicates the
boundaries of "substantially limits" for purposes of the ADA.27
The report states that an impairment does not constitute a disa-
bility unless its "severity is such that it results in a 'substantial
limitation of one or more major life activities.' "28 The report
Act of 1973 and Analogous State Statutes, 22 WILLAMEarE L. REV. 529, 542
(1986) [hereinafter Comment, Handicap] (stating that "substantial limitation"
is the most evasive term within the definition of handicapped individual). But
see Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model ReconsiderecL" Ensuring Equal Op-
portunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 408 (1984) (arguing that "[s]ince...
[1978] ... there has been little controversy concerning the class of persons pro-
tected by [the FRA]").
23. 136 CONG. REC. H1920 (daily ed. May 1, 1990). In fact, the managers of
the ADA refused efforts to outline any objective list of conditions that would
constitute a disability. See id. at H1920-21.
24. 136 CoNG. REC. H4612-13 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (statement of Repre-
sentative Dannemeyer).
25. Courts generally give committee reports greater weight than floor de-
bates, so the uncertainty in the floor debate is overshadowed. W. ESKRIDGE &
P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
709-10 (1988) (stating this principle and discussing the difficulties inherent in
using committee reports to ascertain legislative intent).
26. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 14.
27. Initially, the committee emphasized that when analyzing impairments,
the focus should be on the impairment's effects on the individual with the im-
pairment, not on the impairment's qualities. I& at 22-23.
28. Id. at 22. The committee used the example of a paraplegic. That per-
son would '"have a substantial difficulty" in the major life activity of walking.
Id. The effects of the paraplegia, by definition, would result in an inability to
walk, thus being a severe enough restriction on walking to qualify as a sub-
stantial limitation.
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suggests that the committee focused on an impairment's effects
on an individual's life activities.
The report also notes that substantially limiting impair-
ments cannot be "minor" or "trivial." Rather, the impair-
ments must restrict an individual's major life activity as to the
"conditions, manner, or duration under which [the activities]
can be performed in comparison to most people."30 To illustrate
what it meant by this phrase, the committee used an example:
Suppose a person could walk for ten miles continuously, but
could not walk the eleventh mile without pain. According to
the committee, such a person is not substantially limited in
walking because "most people" would be unable to walk eleven
miles without experiencing some discomfort.3 ' Thus, according
to the key congressional committee, courts should determine
whether an individual is "substantially limited" by analyzing
the extent to which an impairment limits the individual as
measured against the abilities of most unimpaired persons. In
addition, analysis of an impairment's effects should focus on
three ways in which an impairment limits a person's activities:
the manner, conditions, and duration of partaking in a given
activity.32
29. id at 23. The committee's example of a minor impairment was an in-
fected finger.
30. id (emphasis added).
31. I&
32. The report concluded that the definition's "current" test - "a physi-
cal or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life ac-
tivities," ADA, supra note 1, § 3(2)(A) - should cover only impairments that
currently limit a person's activities. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 14, at 23. The
"record of" test - "[an individual who has] a record of such an impairment,"
ADA, supra note 1, § 3(2)(B) - should cover individuals who were at one time
limited to a degree that would satisfy the definition's "current" test, even
though they have recovered from the impairment and would therefore not
qualify under the "current" test. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 14, at 23. This
definition also should cover individuals who were misclassified as having an
impairment of the requisite severity. Id
As examples of disabilities falling under the "record of" test, the commit-
tee included persons with histories of emotional or mental illness, cancer,
heart disease, and people misclassified as being mentally retarded. Id. In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court has concluded that hospitalization is sufficient to
prove disability under the "record of" test. School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987). Although the ADA is silent on the issue,
plaintiffs likely will attempt to use the Supreme Court's conclusion to estab-
lish that hospitalization alone is sufficient for an individual to be considered
disabled under the ADA.
Finally, the committee's report indicates that the "regarded as" test -
"[an individual who is] regarded as having an impairment," ADA, supra note
1, § 3(2)(C) - is intended to include only those persons who are substantially
1308 [Vol. 75:1303
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The House Committee on the Judiciary was the only other
congressional committee to consider the definition of disability
in any detail. Its reportas was similar to the report of the Sen-
ate Committee on Labor and Human Resources,34 except that it
focused specifically on disability in the employment context.
The report initially suggested a broad view of disability, indicat-
ing that an impaired person who faces discrimination in dis-
crete employment situations may be substantially limited in the
major life activity of working.-' Other comments, however,
seem to limit this statement's broad sweep. For example, the
report described a person limited in her ability to perform a
particular job due to the unique circumstances of the job site or
the materials used.36 In that situation, the person may not
qualify as substantially limited in the major life activity of
working.37 Thus, the ADA's text and legislative history are
ambiguous about the meaning of "substantially limits."
limited in the minds of others as a result of being perceived to have a substan-
tially limiting impairment, are treated as if they had such an impairment, or
have such an impairment only as a result of other people's attitudes. S. REP.
No. 116, supra note 14, at 23-24. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 30
(1990) (perception of others is a key element to the test; an individual's per-
ception of her own impairments is not important). The committee stated that
this test would be most relevant to persons with "stigmatic conditions." S.
REP. No. 116, supra note 14, at 24. Although the committee did not define
"stigmatic conditions," it gave as an example a severe burn victim who faces
discrimination because of scarring. IM In addition, the misclassification ele-
ment in the "record of" test is limited to misclassifications that occurred in
the past. Any misclassification that is currently in place would be synonymous
with being "regarded as having" a substantially limiting impairment, thereby
mandating that the individual be covered under the definition's third test.
The committee gave two other examples. The first was a person rejected
for a job because an x-ray reveals a back abnormality, even though the individ-
ual does not evidence any symptoms of a back ailment. S. REP. No. 116, supra
note 14, at 24. This example mirrors the facts of E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall,
497 F. Supp. 1088, 1091-92 (D. Haw. 1980). See infra text accompanying notes
72-75. The second example was a person who wears a hearing aid, even if the
person is able to compensate for impaired hearing by lip reading and the hear-
ing aid. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 14, at 23.
33. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 32.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 26-32.
35. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 32, at 30.
36. 1& at 29.
37. Id This statement is little more than a truism.
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II. "SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITS" UNDER THE FEDERAL
REHABILITATION ACT
A. THE FEDERAL REHABILITATION ACT
Congress passed the FRA to give handicapped persons the
opportunity to participate in the workforce,3 specifically in job
and training opportunities.3 9 The FRA's cornerstone is its pro-
hibition of using handicap as a basis for employment deci-
sions.40 The cornerstone's dimensions are the range of persons
found to be handicapped under the FRA. These dimensions are
defined by those persons who fit within the FRA's definition of
"an individual with handicaps."' 41 A person may be considered
an "individual with handicaps" if she has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits her performance of some
38. The FRA applies to the federal government, 42 U.S.C. § 791 (1988), as
well as to all organizations receiving federal funds. Id § 794. Thus, the rele-
vant workforce excludes the vast majority of private sector employers and em-
ployees who are not within the ambit of the federal government.
39. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 793-94 (1988).
40. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6373, 6390. Following from this goal, the FRA prohib-
its any covered entity from discriminating against a person with handicaps
with regard to both employment and job training opportunities. 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1988). Legislative history indicates that Congress passed the FRA be-
lieving that the prohibition against handicap discrimination would further a
broad government policy against discrimination, a policy that is stated in § 674
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1988), relating to race,
color, and national origin. See S. REP. No. 1297, supra, at 6389-90 (comparing
definition of "handicap" with race and sex discrimination); see also Hearings
on S. 2345 Before Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comn of La-
bor and Human Resources, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1988) [hereinafter Hear-
ings] (statement of Senator Kennedy).
41. The FRA has used various sections and terminology to define the class
of individuals that the FRA protects. When the current definition was
adopted in 1974, Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-516, 88
Stat. 1619 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), the definition was in 29
U.S.C. § 706(6) and read "handicapped individual." In 1978, the definition was
redesignated as 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B). Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. 95-602, title
I § 122(a)(4)-(8), 92 Stat. 2984, 2985. Finally in 1986, Congress substituted "in-
dividual with handicaps" for "handicapped individual," and redesignated the
definition as 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B). Act of Oct. 21, 1986, Pub. L. 99-506, title I
§ 103(c)(1), 100 Stat. 1809-1811. All references to "handicap" refer to "individ-
ual with handicaps" as stated in § 706(8)(B).
42. Under the FRA, an "individual with handicaps" is an individual who
has a "physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more
... major life activities .... has a record of such an impairment, or... is re-
garded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988). See supra
note 8 (defining "disability" under the ADA); supra text accompanying notes
9-11 (discussing the three tests under the ADA).
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major life activity,43 if she was at one time so limited,44 or if a
party covered by the FRA perceives her to be so limited.4 5
B. THE RELEVANCE OF THE FRA TO DECISIONS UNDER THE
ADA
The FRA's definition is critical to determinations of disa-
bility under the ADA. The FRA marked the beginning of a na-
tional movement toward fully integrating disabled individuals
into American society.46 Because of the FRA's prominence,
Congress must have considered both the language of the FRA
and subsequent case law interpreting the FRA, in drafting the
ADA. 47 The fact that in the ADA Congress adopted the FRA's
definition of "individual with handicaps" verbatim supports this
assertion. 48 Further, the ADA specifically links itself with the
43. Specific life activities listed in the regulations include caring for one's
self, performing manual tasks, learning and working. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii)
(1989).
44. Id. § 84.3(j)(2)(iii).
45. Id § 84.3(j)(2)(iv).
46. S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 40, at 6388.
47. In enacting the ADA, Congress presumably was aware of both the
FRA and the interpretations given to the definition of "individual with handi-
caps." See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (when Congress incorpo-
rates language in haec verba, it can be presumed that Congress had an
awareness of the previous statute and interpretations of it). But see W. Es.
KRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 25, at 786-87 (stating that differing historical
and political contexts, as well as compromises during passage of the earlier
statute, may diminish the value of viewing other statutes as aids in
interpretation).
48. ADA, supra note 1, at § 3(2). The FRA's definition of "individual with
handicaps" is contained in 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988). The two definitions
differ only in that § 3(2) of the ADA is labelled "disability," and § 706(8)(B) of
the FRA is labelled "individual with handicaps." The difference in language
reflects Congress's desire to track more closely "currently accepted terminol-
ogy." S. REP. No. 116, supra note 14, at 21.
The ADA's definition of disability also is comparable to the definition of
"=ndicap" contained in another federal statute. The Fair Housing Act's defi-
nition, 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1988), was taken verbatim from the FRA's defini-
tion of "individual with handicaps" and reflects Congress's intent to use the
same definition and concepts from that well-established law. H.R. REP. No.
711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN.
NEWS 2173, 2178.
Sections 3602(h)(1)-(3) of the Fair Housing Act, which elucidate each of
the definition's three subsections, are taken from the regulations promulgated
by the Department of Health & Human Services. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)-
(iv) (1989). When passing the ADA, Congress apparently chose not to make
the Department's regulations part of the definition. Nonetheless, legislative
history indicates that Congress intended that Health & Human Services analy-
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FRA,49 stating that both the FRA and case law interpreting it
should guide interpretation and enforcement of the ADA.se
sis of "individual with handicaps" apply to the definition of "disability" in-
cluded in the ADA. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 14, at 21.
Congress also indicated that the ADA's definition of "disability" would
adopt the Department of Housing & Urban Development's analysis of the Fair
Housing Act's definition of "handicap." S. REP. No. 116, supra note 14, at 21;
24 C.F.R. § 100.201, subch. A, app. A (1990). Because the definition analyzed
by the Department of Housing & Urban Development was taken verbatim
from the FRA and because there is more judicial experience with the language
in the FRA, the primary focus here will be on the FRA and Health, Education
& Welfare's analysis of § 706(8)(B).
49. See ADA, supra note 1, § 107 (Title I, Employment Title) ("The agen-
cies with enforcement authority for actions which allege employment discrimi-
nation under this title and under the [FRA] shall . . . ensure that
administrative complaints filed under this title and under the [FRA] are dealt
with in a manner that... prevents imposition of inconsistent or conkflicting
standards for the same requirements under this title and the [FRA].") (em-
phasis added); ADA, supra note 1, § 204 (Title II, Public Services Title) (all
regulations under subtitle A, "Prohibition Against Discrimination," shall be
consistent with Health & Human Services regulations promulgated pursuant
to § 504 of the FRA (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988)).
50. ADA, supra note 1, § 501(a) ("nothing in this Act will be construed to
apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of [the
FRA]"). This Note focuses on the definition that specifically applies to Title V
of the FRA. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). In addition, while discussing their beliefs
underlying the ADA definition's "regarded as" test, various congressional com-
mittee reports expressly refer to decisions interpreting the FRA, most notably
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). See, eg., S. REP.
No. 116, supra note 14, at 23-24.
Furthermore, it is likely that an ADA plaintiff will have a threshold ques-
tion similar to that of an FRA plaintiff. In order to begin enforcement under
the FRA, a plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of discrimination. The steps
of a prima facie case are that plaintiff:
1) ... is a "handicapped individual" under the Act,
2) ... is "otherwise qualified" for the position sought,
3) ... was excluded from the position sought solely by reason of his
handicap, and
4) the [employing] program or activity in question receives federal
financial assistance.
Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983). All plain-
tiffs seeking to gain protection under the FRA face the threshold question
whether they are an "individual with handicaps." Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d
931, 933 (4th Cir. 1986); de la Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134, 1135 (5th Cir.
1986) (per curiam); Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1248
(6th Cir. 1985); see also O'Connor, Defining "Handicap"for Purposes of Em-
ployment Discrimination, 30 ARiz. L. REv. 633, 637 (1988) (courts struggle to
decide whether plaintiff qualifies as an "individual with handicaps").
It is likely that actions brought under the ADA will use a different set of
elements for proving a prima facie case of discrimination. Because the ADA is
considered to ensure civil rights that Congress has guaranteed to other groups,
ADA, supra note 1, § 2(a)(4); S. REP. No. 116, supra note 14, at 19 (statement
of Attorney General Thornburgh), there is direct connection between the
ADA and rights codified in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
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Thus, an examination of the legislative history and judicial re-
view of the FRA may provide important clues to the meaning
of the phrase "substantially limits" in the ADA.
C. TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FRA
Although "substantially limits" is the critical phrase in the
FRA's definition of "individual with handicaps," 51 neither the
statute nor relevant regulations aid in its interpretation. The
text of the FRA is silent on the meaning of "substantially lim-
its." In addition, although administrative regulations have at-
tempted to clarify other terms contained in the definition,
federal agencies have not ventured an interpretation of "sub-
stantially limits.) 52
The legislative history surrounding the definitionss is also
contradictory. For example, one committee report stated that
Congress wanted a broad enough definition of "handicapped" to
§§ 2000e - j (1988). See H. REP. No. 485, supra note 32, at 27, 31 (stating that
the ADA, Title I, dealing with employment, borrows much of its procedural
framework from Title VII elements). Thus, a prima facie case under the ADA
will probably parallel a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under
Title VII. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
The essential elements of a intentional discrimination claim under Title VII
are that plaintiff:
(i) ... belongs to a racial minority;
(ii) . . . applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer
was seeking applicants;
(iii) ... despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(iv) ... after his rejection, the position remained open and employer
continued to seek applicants from persons - [not in protected
class] - of complainant's qualifications.
Id For cases brought under the ADA, then, the plaintiff can be found a
"member of the protected class" only if she shows that she is "disabled."
Thus, although prima facie cases under the FRA and ADA will likely differ,
both prima facie cases demand that the plaintiff show that she is disabled.
51. Haines, supra note 22, at 530; Comment, Handicap, supra note 22, at
535.
52. Health & Human Services' regulations analyze and develop "physical
impairment," 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A) (1989), "mental impairment," id.
§ 84.3(j)(2)(i)(B), "major life activities," id. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii), "record of such an
impairment," id. § 84.3(j)(2)(iii), and "regarded as having [such] an impair-
ment," id. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv). Health & Human Services' regulations also ex-
pressly state that the Department did not provide further analysis of
"substantially limits" because it did not believe that such an analysis was pos-
sible at that time. Id pt. 84, app. A, at 346. The Department of Labor has de-
fined "substantially limits," 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1990), but that definition only
applies to § 503 of the FRA, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1988), mandating the establish-
ment of affirmative action programs. It does not apply to employment dis-
crimination addressed in § 504 of the FRA. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988).
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encompass the FRA's purposes.M Despite this language, the fi-
nal definition emphasizes a uniform standard,ss one which does
not seem to mandate broad coverage. Rather, it only mandates
that a "handicapped person" have an impairment that, at the
time in question, substantially limited a major life activity.56
Moreover, the definition's subjective nature allows courts to ap-
ply narrower interpretations than Congress may have intended.
In fact, Congress commanded courts to interpret the definition
so that every person found to be handicapped had an impair-
ment that was, at the time in question, a substantial limit on
some major aspect of their lives.57
Perhaps unsurprisingly, courts have not been able to agree
on the parameters of "substantially limits."s Nor have they ar-
rived at a uniform method of analysis for determining when an
impairment "substantially limits" a major life activity under
the FRA. Indeed, judicial decisions under the FRA have gener-
ally lacked substantive analysis of "substantially limits."
D. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE FRA
Despite the ambiguity in the phrase and the lack of legisla-
tive history, some courts have easily determined whether a
plaintiff is an "individual with handicaps." In some cases, the
54. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, S. REP. No. 1297,
supra note 40, at 6388, stated that Congress's intent was that "handicapped in-
dividual" not be narrowly limited, but be broad enough to prevent discrimina-
tion against all handicapped people.
55. By restricting handicapping impairments to those that substantially
limit individuals, the definition's three-part test seems to establish some uni-
form minimum level of restriction that must be met by all persons found
handicapped under the FRA. What this minimum level is, however, has not
been defined.
56. S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 40, at 6389. The definition allows for the
substantially limiting impairment to be current, part of an individual's past, or
exist only in the mind of a covered entity. In its report, the only one issued on
the 1974 amendments to the FRA, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare stressed that all three subsections of the definition depended on a de-
termination that the impairment at issue was substantially limiting in some
way. Ik; see also School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283 n.10
(1987).
57. S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 40, at 6389.
58. 'For a comprehensive list of the various conditions argued to be handi-
caps, see Frierson, Determining Coverage Under the Handicapped Employ-
ment Laws, 40 LAB. L.J. 630 passim (1989); Larson, What Disabilities are
Protected Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973?, 37 LAB. L.J. 752, 754 (1986);
Annotation, Who is "Individual With Handicaps" Under Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 (29 U.S.CS. §§ 701 et seq.), 97 A.L.R. FED. 40, 51-89 (1990) (providing
comprehensive listing of impairments alleged to be "handicaps").
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parties have stipulated that the plaintiff is handicapped.P9 In
others, the courts have quickly concluded that the plaintiff is
not handicapped,6° such as when the plaintiff's alleged handi-
cap was left-handedness.
The judicial task is considerably more difficult, however,
when cases present uncertain facts or non-classic impair-
ments.61 Based on the statutory language and legislative his-
tory, one might expect courts to examine whether the alleged
impairment in some way "substantially limits" one or more of
the plaintiff's major life activities. Courts, however, often have
not followed this approach. Some courts have dealt with the is-
sue largely in conclusory terms, merely stating that the plain-
tiff is62 or is not63 an individual with handicaps, without
59. Hall v. United States Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1078 (6th Cir. 1988)
(hip, foot, and back injuries prevented plaintiff from doing all of the walking,
lifting, and bending required of a mail carrier); Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559,
563 (9th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff was deaf, mute, and visually impaired); Brennan
v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1260 (5th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff was blind); Doe ex rel
Gonzales v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1476 (9th Cir. 1986) (emotionally disturbed
child with aggressive tendencies); Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666, 668 (11th
Cir. 1983) (dyslexic plaintiff who could not read beyond the "most elementary
level"); Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505, 517 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (plaintiff with dia-
betes); Conlon v. City of Long Beach, 676 F. Supp. 1289, 1293 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)
(plaintiff confined to a wheelchair).
60. de la Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)
(left-handed plaintiff had no "impairment," as left-handedness is a physical
characteristic and not an impairment); Hayes v. Proviso Area Retarded Citi-
zens, Inc., No. 87-C9254 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 1987) (WESTLAW, Federal Cases
database, DCT file) (plaintiff's current use of alcohol expressly excluded him
from coverage under the FRA).
61. See supra note 14 (discussing non-classic impairments).
62. See Harrison v. Marsh, 691 F. Supp. 1223, 1230 (W.D. Mo. 1988); Perez
v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 677 F. Supp. 357, 360-61 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Kohl ex
reL Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Center, 672 F. Supp. 1226, 1236 (W.D. Mo.
1987), rev'd on other grounds, 865 F.2d 930 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 110 S. Ct.
239 (1989); Mahoney v. Ortiz, 645 F. Supp. 22, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Traynor v.
Walters, 606 F. Supp. 391, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd 791 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1986),
rev'd sub nor. Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988).
In Marsh, the court properly concluded that plaintiff, who had lost sub-
stantial portions of the muscle in her shoulder, arm and chest as a result of a
mastectomy, was handicapped. 691 F. Supp. at 1229. The court concluded,
however, that it could rely totally on the first prong of the definition of indi-
vidual with handicaps to find the presence of a handicap. Id at 1230. See 29
U.S.C. § 706(8)(B)(i) (1988). The court stated-
[I]t cannot be seriously disputed that [plaintiff's] impairment affected
her ability to work. That is self-evident. Work is clearly among one's
major life activities. Ergo, even if one assumes, arguendo, that [plain-
tiff's] condition impairs only her ability to work, then she nonetheless
clearly qualifies as handicapped within the meaning of the Act.
691 F. Supp. at 1230 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
The court's analysis is flawed in that it failed to consider whether the i-
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employing an analytic method for determining whether an indi-
vidual is handicapped.6 4 These decisions suggest that courts
consider some substantial limitation on a major life activity to
be either inherent in or absent from the plaintiff's impairment.
Even when courts have examined the relevant statutory
language they have continued to treat the issues as self-deter-
mining. In Santiago v. Temple University,65 for example, the
plaintiff suffered an eye injury that caused the partial loss of
vision in one eye, while the vision in his other eye was unaf-
fected.66 The court noted that plaintiff could be found handi-
capped only if this impairment substantially limited his ability
to perform in the workplace.67 Although the court stated the
pairment substantially limited the plaintiff's ability to work. That the impair-
ment affected her ability to work is immaterial. Unless the impairment
substantially limits the ability to work, the plaintiff should be excluded from
coverage.
63. Diaz v. United States Postal Serv., 658 F. Supp. 484, 492 (E.D. Cal.
1987) (concluding even if Diaz's low back pain were found to be an impair-
ment, seven brief absences over a two-year span were not enough to prove that
he was substantially limited in his ability to work, especially when Diaz effec-
tively performed mail carrier duties while at work).
64. A case that exemplifies a complete failure to conduct any sort of anal-
ysis is Alderson v. Postmaster Gen. of United States, 598 F. Supp. 49 (W.D.
Okla. 1984). Alderson injured his knee while delivering mail. Id- at 52. The
court concluded that Alderson had not sufficiently proven that his knee injury
was an impairment that substantially limited his ability to work. Id- at 53-54.
As a result, the court found Alderson not handicapped under the FRA. Id In
reaching its conclusion, the court simply traced the factual development of Al-
derson's recovery, but made no effort to discuss its analysis or the rationale for
its decision.
Additiofially, the court concluded that at no time had the post office's
management "regarded" Alderson as being substantially limited in his ability
to work. Id. at 54. To buttress this conclusion, the court traced the factual
record of management's actions during Alderson's recovery. I& The court
again failed to give any reasoning that explained why the facts of the case war-
ranted its conclusion that Alderson was not substantially limited as a result of
the perceptions of or treatment by his superiors.
The court concluded that no postal management person had "perceived
[Alderson] at any time to be handicapped in any sense of that term." I& This
conclusion seems to indicate that if management had perceived Alderson as
handicapped, he would be a "handicapped person" under the FRA. This state-
ment is a clear tautology. Because it failed to adhere to proper language, it is
difficult to determine whether the court was confused about the standard for
finding a perceived handicap under the definition's "regarded as" test. If the
court had stated the equation properly, it would have said that if management
had perceived Alderson to be substantially limited in his ability to work, he
would be a "handicapped person."
65. 739 F. Supp. 974 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
66. Id- at 978.
67. Id.
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proper test, the court made no attempt to apply it to the facts.
Rather, the court summarily concluded that the plaintiff's con-
dition did not qualify as a handicap.68 Finally, the court found
that the plaintiff's recurrent eye inflammation, which limited
his ability to attend work regularly, was also not a handicap-
ping impairment. The court reasoned that a contrary finding
would violate Congress's intent,6 9 but failed to cite any author-
ity for this assertion.
1. The Black decision
Unlike poorly reasoned decisions such as Santiago, the
court in E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall 70 articulated a set of fac-
tors and a method of analysis for determining whether a plain-
tiff's impairment is sufficient to qualify the plaintiff as an
"individual with handicaps" under the FRA.71 By doing so,
Black represents the most comprehensive effort to articulate a
formula for determining whether an impairment constitutes a
substantial limitation on a major life activity under the FRA.
In Black, the plaintiff contractor sought to reverse a De-
partment of Labor finding that the contractor had discrimi-
68. Id. The court stated that "plaintiff's condition is not of the type which
so interferes with his ability to perform in the workplace that it requires ac-
commodation .... " Id. The court then added another ground for its holding,
one which also failed to provide any guidance as to the analytical foundations
for its decision: "Moreover, as defendants have correctly argued, there is no
case law holding that partial vision loss in one eye is a handicap [under] the
Act." Id. The Santiago decision stands directly opposed to the decision in
Holly v. City of Naperville, 603 F. Supp. 220, 229 (N.D. IM. 1985), where it was
undisputed that the plaintiff, who was blind in one eye, was handicapped.
That two courts could reach opposite conclusions for the same impairment in-
dicates that problems exist in judicial treatment of "substantially limits."
69. Santiago, 739 F. Supp. at 979. The court asserted that under Santiago's
theory, it would have to find all chronic illnesses that prevent an employee
from working on a regular basis to be handicaps under the FRA. I The
court concluded that such a finding clearly would be inconsistent with Con-
gressional intent under the FRA. Id- The court does not state the source of its
Congressional intent.
Given the lack of any authority for the court's conclusions, the decision
has little value for understanding the parameters of "substantially limits."
Moreover, the court's decision seems misguided. Recurring eye inflammation
that results from an eye injury and which prevents an individual from meeting
any regular work schedule is an impairment which substantially limits that in-
dividual's major life activity of working. See infra Part IH. C.
70. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980). For commentaries on the Black de-
cision, see Haines, supra note 22; Comment, Rehabilitation Act of 1973, supra
note 22; Comment, Handicap, supra note 22.
71. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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nated against the complainant on the basis of a handicap.72 The
complainant had been rejected for a carpenter's assistant posi-
tion.73 The contractor rejected the applicant after an x-ray re-
vealed a latent, asymptomatic back abnormality.74 There was
no evidence that the abnormality actually impaired the appli-
cant's ability to perform, but the examining physician told the
contractor that the applicant was a poor risk for heavy labor.75
The court held that the applicant was "substantially limited" in
the major life activity of "working."76
In determining the meaning of "substantially limits," the
Black court took a middle ground between only requiring a per-
son to produce one instance in which the impairment resulted
in disqualification from a particular employment opportunity
and requiring a person to show that an impairment results in
complete disqualification from employment. On the one hand,
the Black court found that a person is not "substantially" lim-
ited in working simply because an impairment resulted in a
person being rejected from a particular job.77 Noting that Con-
gress chose to use a limiting adjective - "substantially" - in
the definition of "individual with handicaps,"78 the court rea-
soned that Congress intended a plaintiff to show more than
that he "[was] capable of performing a particular job, and [was]
rejected for that particular job because of a real or perceived
impairment. ' 79 On the other hand, the court noted that a per-
son need not show that his impairment affected his em-
72. 497 F. Supp. at 1093.
73. Id- at 1091.
74. Id,
75. I&
76. Id at 1102.
77. Id. at 1099. This finding had been the basis for the Assistant Secretary
of Labor's reversal of the initial determination of the complaint. See infra
note 80 and accompanying text. The Secretary concluded that the FRA did
not require a complainant to show that her impairment impeded activities rel-
evant to many or most jobs. 497 F. Supp. at 1094. Rather, the Secretary con-
cluded that the FRA covers every individual who has an impairment that is a
current bar to employment of his or her choice, provided only that the individ-
ual is currently capable of performing the job. Id
78. 497 F. Supp. at 1099.
79. Id. The court reached this conclusion, despite stating that Congress
intended the coverage of the FRA to be broad in scope. Id at 1102. To illus-
trate its belief that the FRA does not cover persons who have been rejected
from only one job, the court suggested that the lesser standard would mean
that a person who was offered a job at 10 of 11 plants, but was not offered a
position at the eleventh because of an allergy to a material at the plant, would
be covered by the FRA. Id at 1099. But see H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 32,
at 29 (discussing the same scenario and indicating that, depending on the se-
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ployability generally - that is, his ability to be employed at
all.80 If a person were disqualified from employment in his
chosen field, he should be considered substantially limited in
the activity of working.8 '
After stating that "substantially limits" required a showing
of more than one rejection from a single employment opportu-
nity,8 2 the Black court articulated a definition of substantial
limitation in the employment context:8 3 disqualification from a
given occupation in the geographic area reasonably accessible to
the individual.84 To determine the extent of a person's disquali-
fication the court would have to do an ad hoc analysis, focusing
on the impairment's effect on the individual's ability to work in
his chosen field. 5
Although the Black decision is limited to the major life ac-
tivity of working,8 6 the court's approach has wider application.
Its analysis resulted in a formula that focused on an impair-
ment's effects on a person's individual situation. Further, the
formula is composed of multiple, discrete factors capable of be-
ing factually established.8 7 Despite the problems inherent in
verity of the impairment's effect, being rejected from one job might be a sub-
stantial limitation).
80. 497 F. Supp. at 1099. This finding had been the basis for the adminis-
trative law judge's decision denying the complainant's cause of action against
Black. Id at 1094. The A.L.J. concluded that Congress had intended the FRA
to apply only to people with most disabling impairments. Id. at 1093. Because
the applicant had not shown that his perceived impairment limited his ability
to work in any but a few jobs, his ability to work was not "substantially" lim-
ited. Id
81. Id. at 1099.
82. IA.
83. In Black, the limitation on employment is based upon the court's focus
on occupations from which an individual is disqualified. This focus simply is
not analogous to life activities such as walking or hearing. See infra Part III.
C.
84. 497 F. Supp. at 1101 (if an individual is disqualified from the same or
similar jobs offered by employers throughout the area to which he has reason-
able access, then the court would have to consider his current impairment,
past impairment or perceived impairment as substantially limiting his ability
to work).
85. Id. at 1100 (holding that the requisite determination must involve a
"case-by-case determination of whether the impairment or perceived impair-
ment of a rejected, qualified job seeker, constitutes, for that individual, a sub-
stantial [limitation on the major life activity of working]" (emphasis added)).
86. See supra note 83.
87. The Black factors were: (1) the number and types of jobs from which
the impaired individual is disqualified, based on criteria assumed to be in use
generally, such that all employers offering the same or similar jobs would use
the same requirement or screening process; (2) the geographical area to which
the applicant has reasonable access - the smaller the number of employers in
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the Black court's definition of "substantially limits,"s the
method of analysis is a distinct improvement over courts that
failed to conduct any analysis. Moreover, the Black court's fo-
cus on effects and discernible factors can be transferred to fu-
ture cases involving other major life activities.
2. Post-Black decisions
In the years following Black, several courts have used its
formula to interpret "substantially limits."8 9 Although most
courts using the Black analysis have concluded that the plain-
tiff was not handicapped,90 at least one court using the Black
the area, the more that one rejection could foreclose the plaintiff's chosen
field; and (3) the individual's own job expectations and training. 497 F. Supp.
at 1101.
88. See infra Part III. C.
89. The Black decision also became part of the ADA's legislative history.
Although the House committee report, H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 32, does
not refer to the decision, the example illustrating its argument, supra text ac-
companying note 36, is similar to the Black court's reasoning. See supra text
accompanying notes 77-85 (discussing the Black decision). The committee's ex-
ample is a painter who is rejected from consideration for a painting job be-
cause of his mild allergy to a paint that his employer uses, but that is not
generally used by the field in which the painter works. H.R. REP. No. 485,
supra note 32, at 29. Such a person would not be substantially limited in
working, presumably because he could go to another employer who does not
use the specific paint. The committee goes on to aver that the same painter,
who has a severe allergy to the paint - with resulting skin disease or seizures
- would, by virtue of the resulting condition, be substantially limited by the
severity of the allergy's effects. Id
90. Most courts facing the issue have held that an individual who has been
rejected or terminated from only one job is not substantially limited in the
major life activity of working. Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1989)
(the regulations issued to effectuate the FRA cannot be interpreted to define
life activity of working as "working at the specific job of one's choice"); Forrisi
v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 935 (4th Cir. 1986) (an employer "regards" the appli-
cant as substantially limited only if the employer believes that the applicant is
foreclosed from the desired category of employment (citing Black, 497 F. Supp.
at 1099)); Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1250 & n.6 (6th
Cir. 1985) (error for trial court to conclude that a person whose strabismus
(cross-eyes) precluded him from only one job was substantially limited in ac-
tivity of working); Fuqua v. Unisys Corp., 716 F. Supp. 1201, 1205-06 (D. Minn.
1989) (federal court interpreted state law taken verbatim from FRA and con-
cluded that being disqualified from only one position was not a substantial lim-
itation on activity of working); Fields v. Lyng, 705 F. Supp. 1134, 1136 (D. Md.
1988) (an impairment that interferes with one job or only a narrow range of
jobs is not substantially limiting, but one that generally forecloses a category
of work may be a substantial limitation), aff'd mem, 888 F.2d 1385 (4th Cir.
1989); Elstner v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 659 F. Supp. 1328, 1343 (S.D. Tex.
1987) (plaintiff's knee problem, although an impairment, was one that was
shown to limit only one job activity; as a result, plaintiff's impairment was less
than a substantial limitation on his ability to work), aff'd mer., 863 F.2d 881
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formula has found that the plaintiff was handicapped.91
Some post-Black courts also have been asked to decide
whether the plaintiff was handicapped under the FRA because
an employer "regarded" the employee as being substantially
limited.92 Courts facing this claim have extended the Black
rule,93 generally holding that an individual is not "regarded as
having an impairment" simply because one employer rejected
an individual from a single position.9
E. CURRENT STATUS OF "SUBSTANTIA.LY LnmTs"
UNDER THE FRA
Courts disagree about the degree to which an impairment
must limit a major life activity before it is "substantially" limit-
(5th Cir. 1988); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 745 (C.D. Cal.
1984) (failure to qualify for a single job because of some impairment does not
constitute being limited in a major life activity, because major life activity of
working does not include working at the specific job of one's choice; nor does
it demand being excluded from all employment).
91. Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Md. 1985). In Carty, the plaintiff
suffered from a hernia and had a record of a heart attack and a nervous break-
down. I& at 1183. The court reasoned that even if a person has an impair-
ment, she still must show that the impairment "substantially limit[s] one or
more of such person's major life activities." Id at 1184. After listing the three
factors articulated in the Black decision, see supra note 87, the court concluded
that the plaintiff had not stated that his laborer/custodian position was the
only position from which his impairment disqualified him. Carty, 623 F. Supp.
at 1185. Because the decision arose on a motion for summary judgment, the
court, in looking at the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, could
not state that plaintiff was not handicapped under the FRA. Id-
In Coley v. Secretary of Army, 689 F. Supp. 519 (D. Md. 1987), the court
did not refer to the Black rule, but found Coley handicapped because his osteo-
arthritis precluded him from any jobs involving physical labor or outdoor
work. I&L at 520-21. This included any cook position, the occupation for which
Coley was trained. Id In deciding that Coley's impairment disqualified him
from all occupations involving certain tasks, Coley impliedly followed the
Black rule.
92. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B)(3) (1988). This is the definition's "regarded as"
test, which allows a plaintiff to be considered handicapped under the FRA if
the plaintiff can show that the defendant perceived the plaintiff to be or
treated the plaintiff as if he were substantially limited in a major life activity.
93. See supra note 83.
94. Forrisi, 794 F.2d at 935 (an employee is regarded as handicapped if the
employer believes that the employee's impairment forecloses generally the
type of employment involved); Fuqua, 716 F. Supp. at 1207 (an employer re-
gards an individual as handicapped by finding the employee's impairment to
foreclose generally the category of desired employment) (quoting Forrisi 794
F.2d at 935); Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 746 (because the failure to qualify for a
single job does not constitute a limitation on a major life activity, refusing to
hire someone for a single job does not, by itself, constitute perceiving the
plaintiff as substantially limited).
1991] 1321
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ing.95 The lack of a coherent framework for determining the
necessary degree of impairment causes the confusion in this
area. The Black formula,96 although useful, is limited to cases
95. There is little case law from the Supreme Court on this issue,
although the Court's decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480
U.S. 273 (1987), has been heralded as greatly expanding the reach of the FRA.
See Frierson, supra note 58, at 640; O'Connor, supra note 50, at 648. In Arline
the Court held that the plaintiff school teacher's "record of" tuberculosis es-
tablished her as an individual with handicaps. 480 U.S. at 289. The primary
effect of the Arline decision, however, resulted from the Court's holding that
individuals with contagious diseases could not be excluded from the FRA's
protection. Although specifically refusing to decide the issue of AIDS, id at
282 n.7, the Court nonetheless issued a very significant decision noting Con-
gress had not specifically addressed AIDS during passage of the FRA. Hear-
ings, supra note 40, at 19 (statement of Senator Kennedy).
In addition, the Court's discussion of the legislative history surrounding
the FRA's definition provides an argument for finding an individual handi-
capped under the definition's "regarded as" test. See supra note 8 (listing "re-
garded as" test). Finally, the Court may have extended the definition's
"record of" test - "having a record of such an impairment" - by concluding
that the plaintiff's hospitalization for tuberculosis was sufficient proof that her
life activities were substantially limited. Arline, 480 U.S. at 281. It is not clear
from the opinion, however, whether hospitalization is itself sufficient to consti-
tute a substantial limitation on a major life activity, or whether hospitalization
must be of a certain type or duration.
The Arline decision does not, however, aid understanding of what "sub-
stantially limits" means. In fact, the Court did not discuss when an individual
would be substantially limited under either the "record of" or "regarded as"
tests. The Court limited its discussion to the purposes behind the "regarded
as" test, stating- "Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths
and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical
limitations that flow from actual impairment." Id at 284. Thus, Arline seems
only to say that an individual need not be actually impaired in order to be con-
sidered an "individual with handicaps." This statement, however, was already
a recognized part of the FRA. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv) (1989).
Finally, the Arline decision had a direct impact on the ADA. Individuals
with contagious diseases are within the provisions of the ADA provided that
they prove themselves to have a disability. ADA, supra note 1, § 103(d)(2).
Congress enacted an amendment to the ADA, however, which provides a com-
promise between concerns for public safety and the civil rights of food han-
dlers who may have contagious diseases. Id Nonetheless, it seems clear that
in amending the ADA, Arline's concern about "myths and fears" was in Con-
gress's thoughts:
This amendment appropriately carries out both the letter and the
spirit of... the ADA. Instead of allowing false perceptions to deter-
mine whether an employee may remain in a particular job, this provi-
sion ensures that valid public health guidelines, rather than false
perceptions, will determine the protection afforded under this title.
Conference Report to Accompany S. 933, 134 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 11
(supp.) at S-32 (July 16, 1990) (emphasis added) (officially published in edited
form, with quoted material omitted, as H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 558, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1990)).
96. See supra notes 84-85, 87 (discussing method of analysis).
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dealing with the major life activity of working. Subsequent
courts, when faced with determining whether an individual is
substantially limited in other major life activities, have not dis-
cussed or devised similar analyses.97 Further, few commenta-
tors have addressed the issue.98
Because the class of persons that the ADA protects cannot
be objectively determined,99 courts will bear primary responsi-
bility for delimiting the definition of "disability" under the
ADA. As a result of similarities in purpose and language, as
well as the likely identity of parties and issues, courts will look
to the FRA when interpreting the ADA. Although the FRA
may provide some guidance to courts, under the ADA its use-
fulness is limited. The statute's ambiguity, combined with the
lack of a method for analyzing the extent to which an impair-
ment limits an individual, demonstrates the shortcomings of
the FRA in determining the meaning of "substantially limits"
under the ADA. Nevertheless, a manageable test is needed. 10°
97. When deciding employment cases, most post-Black courts have simply
applied the Black analysis. See supra notes 84-85 (discussing the analysis).
98. An earlier work, Comment, Rehabilitation Act of 1973, supra note 22,
at 675, provides the only extensive treatment of the phrase. That comment ar-
gues that "substantially" should be interpreted as meaning "actual" or "real,"
a thing that possesses substance. Id Reasoning from this view, the comment
concludes that a plaintiff need only show that a limitation exists to satisfy the
substantially limits standard. I& at 680. This conclusion cannot be squared
with the conclusion in Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1099, or with Congress's stated
intent in enacting the ADA. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 14, at 22; supra
Part I. B.
99. Unlike the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a) (1988), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)
(1988), which have objective categories of protected classes - race, gender, na-
tional origin, and age, respectively - the ADA contains a subjective definition
of "disability." Under the ADA, the judge must determine whether the plain-
tiff has established that her impairment "substantially limits" her ability to
partake in one of her major life activities. Thus, although inclusion in the pro-
tected class is equally important under Title VII and the ADA, the subjective
nature of the ADA's definition makes determining inclusion under it consider-
ably more difficult. See supra note 23 (noting Congress's refusal to make the
definition objective).
100. The ADA's legislative history indicates a continuing confusion about
how to apply the definition. For example, in the Senate committee report, S.
REP. No. 116, supra note 14, at 24, a back abnormality and hearing loss were
examples of the "regarded as" test. See supra note 32 (Senate committee's ex-
planation of the definition).
The two examples do little to determine Congress's intent, but for differ-
ent reasons. For the back abnormality to be a disability, the abnormality must
be regarded as substantially limiting some activity. According to the rule ar-
ticulated in Black, see supra note 84 and accompanying text, such a showing -
for the major life activity of working - demands that the individual show
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Part III proposes a framework by which courts can determine
whether a person is substantially limited in a major life activity
and therefore disabled under the ADA.
III. PROPOSED METHOD OF DETERMINING
"DISABILITY"
A. "SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITS" FOR PURPOSES OF DEFINING
"DISABILrTY"
1. A Standard of Severity for "Substantially Limits"
Courts should find an individual substantially limited only
upon a showing that he is more limited in a major life activity
than are most people performing that activity.10 1 This standard
is consistent with legislative history and the purposes that moti-
vated the ADA's passage: that persons who are truly disabled
be protected from discrimination.102
The Senate committee report uses the phrase "most peo-
ple."' 03 When so used as an adjective, "most" is commonly de-
fined as "the majority of."''1 4 Therefore, the phrase "most
people" is most reasonably interpreted to mean that the indi-
vidual is restricted to a greater degree than the majority of peo-
ple. The Committee likely would not have used "most" if it
more than that one employer regarded the individual as substantially limited.
497 F. Supp. at 1099. The example fails to make clear how the mere existence
of a back abnormality fits in with Congress's conception of "substantially lim-
ited."
In using the example of a person with a hearing aid, the committee mud-
dies waters it had earlier made clear. In the comments regarding the defini-
tion's "current" test, the committee stated that the presence of a statutory
disability should be determined "without regard to the availability of mitigat-
ing measures, such as... auxiliary aids." S. REP. No. 116, supra note 14, at 23.
Accordingly, unless her hearing is not substantially limited, a person with a
hearing impairment would be disabled by the impairment alone. Other peo-
ple's perceptions about the hearing aid should be relevant only if the person's
hearing is not sufficiently restricted to qualify under the "current" test. Ac-
cord H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 32, at 29.
By intimating that the presence of a hearing aid can result in disabled sta-
tus, Congress is glossing over the question that should be central to the defini-
tion: is the impairment at issue one which for the individual constitutes a
substantial limitation on a major life activity? If it is, then other people's per-
ceptions are immaterial. The "regarded as" test, then, applies only to those
persons who have an impairment that would not satisfy either the "current"
test or the "record of" test.
101. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 14, at 23.
102. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
103. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 14, at 23.
104. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 774 (9th ed. 1987) [hereinaf-
ter WEBSTER'S].
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had meant a comparison group of a smaller percentage. The
Senate committee's example of the person who could not walk
eleven miles without discomfort strengthens this conclusion.10 5
Because the majority of people cannot walk eleven miles with-
out some discomfort, a person who cannot do so is not substan-
tially limited in the major life activity of walking.
This "majority of" standard will provide courts with a reli-
able threshold for both classic and non-classic impairments.1°6
It will protect truly disabled people and adhere to legislative in-
tent that courts should not consider minor and trivial impair-
ments as disabilities. 10 7 At the same time, the "majority of"
standard will not place an excessive burden on a plaintiff at-
tempting to gain the ADA's protection. In cases where the se-
verity of the impairment is not self-evident, courts may need to
require an impaired plaintiff to establish that her impairment
restricts her to a greater degree than the majority of people
who do not have the impairment. In most cases, a plaintiff can
attempt to prove the requisite level of severity with expert
medical testimony about the specific life activity. 08
Non-classic impairments especially need the consistent ap-
plication of this standard, primarily because their effects are
not immediately obvious.109 For example, obesity is a medical
condition that exists when a person is twenty percent or more
over her ideal body weight."n The effects of obesity, however,
105. See supra text accompanying note 31.
106. See supra note 14 (discussing the differences between classic and non-
classic impairments and the problems that arise when determining whether
impairments in the latter category are disabilities).
107. See supra note 29.
108. For most major life activities, such as walking, it should be possible to
provide non-expert testimony establishing the extent to which the majority of
non-impaired people can walk, as well as testimony establishing whether the
plaintiff can participate in the activity of walldng to a similar degree.
109. See upra note 14 (defining "non-classic" impairment).
110. MERcK MANUAL OF DIAGNOsIS AND THERAPY 950 (15th ed. 1987). The
20% standard is considered to be arbitrary. Id- In addition, obesity can be fur-
ther classified: mild (20-40% over weight); moderate (41-100% over weight);
severe (greater than 100% over weight). Id Of these categories, 90.5% of all
obese women are considered to be mildly obese, 9% are considered to be mod-
erately obese, and 0.5% are considered to be severely obese. Id- at 953. These
statistics point directly to the need to examine the effects of the disability, not
its arbitrary definition.
The existence of three categories of obesity indicates that obesity will
have differential effects on people's lives. Although a court easily may find a
person 150% over his ideal weight disabled under this Note's proposal, it does
not follow that a person 35% over his ideal body weight is equally limited in
any major life activity. As such, although both people would be "obese," only
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can vary. Thus, the mere existence of obesity should not result
in a finding that a person is disabled. Rather, the court should
require an obese plaintiff to show that the effects of obesity re-
sult in restrictions on her major life activities that are more se-
vere than those faced by the majority of non-obese people."'
Although the standard is fact-specific and will not, at least
initially, achieve a high level of predictability, it will ensure
that all Courts apply a uniform standard focusing on an impair-
ment's effects. The current state of the law has little chance of
ever establishing predictability or uniformity. Given the defini-
tion's ad hoc focus, this iterative and uniform approach may
never result in strict predictability, but it will result in a coher-
ent body of decisions faithful to the statute's language and leg-
islative history. In addition, the ADA's definition seems to
accept some unpredictability: it revolves around an impair-
ment's effects on an individual's life, rather than on some
mechanical test.112
2. A Factor Analysis for Substantially Limited
In addition to a majority standard of severity, courts should
apply a multi-factor analysis that focuses on determining
whether a given impairment's effects restrict the manner, con-
ditions, or durationI" of a person's ability to engage in a major
life activity. Using these factors is consistent with the approach
one of them would be truly "disabled." Under existing law, however, a court
could fail to examine the effects of obesity on the obese person's activities, and
hence, might fail to remain faithful to the purpose of the ADA.
111. For example, if obesity is so severe that it causes the need for artificial
supports to walk, that person is restricted in his ability to walk in comparison
to the majority of non-obese people. Therefore, this person is "substantially
limited" in the major life activity of walking.
112. The ADA defines disability as, "with respect to an individual... [an]
impairment that substantially limits ... such individual." ADA, supra note 1,
§ 3(2) (emphasis added). The two references to an individual underscore the
ad hoc and fact-specific nature of determining disability.
113. The duration element raises another issue: impairments that are of a
limited duration or transitory. Federal disability law should not cover individ-
uals with impairments that are limited in duration. Most courts facing the is-
sue under the FRA have held that they are not. See, e.g., Evans v. City of
Dallas, 861 F.2d 846, 852, 853 n.39 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that Congress no-
where stated an intent to cover such impairments); Stevens v. Stubbs, 576 F.
Supp. 1409, 1414 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (citing decisions that deny coverage for transi-
tory conditions). This conclusion is supported by congressional testimony, see
supra note 14 and accompanying text, and by commentators. See Comment,
Handicap, supra note 22, at 540 (arguing that impairments must be "immuta-
ble" - safely ameliorated only over a long period of time - in order to be
considered handicaps).
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articulated in the Senate committee report." 4 Further, these
factors properly focus on the fact that impairments are disa-
bling because they restrict, in some substantial way, an individ-
ual's ability to live.
Although the committee report does not indicate specific
definitions for either "conditions," "manner," or "duration," the
committee likely intended the normal and usual meaning of the
terms. 51 Thus, "conditions" probably relates to the elements
that surround the activity and are necessary for its occur-
renceU 6 Following from the above distinction, courts should
regard "conditions" as the elements that must be present in or-
der to conduct an activity. To illustrate, imagine a person with
depression or leukemia who cannot satisfy her basic life needs
without constant assistance. In this situation, the impairment's
effects restrict the "conditions" under which the leukemia vic-
tim is able to engage in the major life activity of "caring for
one's self."1 7 In other words, another person's assistance is a
necessary element for the occurrence of personal care. Because
the majority of unimpaired people do not depend on others to
take care of themselves, the leukemia victim is substantially
limited in the major life activity of caring for herself.
"Manner," in turn, probably denotes the procedure of con-
ducting the activity itself," 8 or how the individual must go
about partaking in the major life activity. In contrast to "condi-
tions," which focuses on an activity's requisite elements, "man-
ner" focuses on the general process by which the activity is
conducted. For example, consider a person with dyslexia who
is unable to read and write and therefore can learn only by oral
instruction and recitation. Because his learning process cannot
include reading and writing, the process by which he can learn
is more restricted than the process by which most non-dyslexic
people learn. As a result, he is substantially limited in the ma-
jor life activity of learning."9
114. See supra text accompanying note 30.
115. W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 25, at 642-43 (discussing ca-
nons of statutory interpretation and stating that ordinary meanings of words
should apply unless the statute deals with a technical or specialized subject).
116. WEBSTER'S, supra note 104, at 273.
117. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1989).
118. WEBsTER's, supra note 104, at 975.
119. For non-classic impairments, which often vary in degree, courts
should assess the actual ways in which an individual is restricted in perform-
ing the given activity. For example, people with dyslexia may have difficulty
reading beyond a certain level, but that limitation may not be more restrictive
than the level beyond which the majority of non-dyslexic people can read.
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Finally, "duration" probably indicates the length of time in
which a person can partake in a life activity. For example, a
person with emphysema may only be able to breathe on her
own for a few minutes. Because the length of time in which
she can breathe on her own is more restricted than the time pe-
riod during which most people without emphysema can breathe
on their own, she is substantially limited in the activity of
breathing.
B. APPLYING THE PROPOSED ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE
"DISABILITY"
Under the ADA, an individual can be found disabled by
satisfying one of three tests. The "current" test requires a
showing that an impairment substantially limits a major life ac-
tivity. The "record of" test requires a showing that an impair-
ment was at one time so limiting or was misclassified as so
limiting. The "regarded as" test requires a showing that a party
covered under the ADA either perceives or treats an individ-
ual's impairment as being so limiting. 20
1. The "Current" Test
The first part of the ADA's definition of disability inquires
whether the person is currently substantially limited.-21 In ap-
plying the proposed analysis to the "current" test, a court
should find that an individual is disabled only if the individual
is currently restricted as to the duration, conditions, or manner
in which she can partake in a given activity in comparison to
most people. The proposed standard focuses both on how the
impairment currently manifests itself in restrictions on a per-
son's activities, as well as on the severity of those restrictions.
Applying the proposed analysis will lead to results that
support the purposes of the ADA. For example, in Grube v.
Bethlehem Area School District,2 2 the plaintiff, a high school
student with one kidney, sought to enjoin school officials from
preventing him from playing football.123 The court found the
Thus, courts should not conclude, for example, that a graduate student with
dyslexia is disabled merely because she is dyslexic.
120. See supra notes 9-11.
121. See supra note 8 (providing the definition of disability under the
ADA).
122. 550 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
123. Id. at 419. The officials had refused to let Grube play because they be-
lieved football would endanger his health. Id. In granting the temporary in-
junction allowing him to play, the court ruled that Grube had shown that he
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student handicapped under the FRA, apparently assuming that
having only one kidney was itself a handicapping condition.
The facts of the case show that this assumption was wrong.
The plaintiff was a vigorous, athletically-inclined high school
student whose only physical problem was the absence of his
right kidney124 Further, the plaintiff's remaining kidney was
"healthy and fully compensate[d] for the one he lost."' s
Had the court followed the proposed standard of severity
and focused on the effects of the underlying condition instead
of on the condition itself, it would have properly concluded that
the plaintiff was not handicapped under the "current" test.Y6
The impairment did not restrict the plaintiff's major life activi-
ties more severely as compared to most people.127 By focusing
on an impairment's effects, courts will not use the ADA im-
properly to protect a person simply because he has overcome
some adversity. Rather, the ADA will be used as intended: to
protect adversity only when it rises to the level of a "substan-
tial limitation."
2. The "Record Of" Test
To show disability, a plaintiff may use not only the "cur-
rent" test, but in the alternative may show a "record of" a sub-
stantially limiting impairment at some time in the past.'M
Under the "record of" test, courts should find a person disabled
if at any time in the past the person suffered from an impair-
ment that restricted them to the degree required under the
"current" test,129 or if the person was misclassified as being so
restricted.130 In other words, courts must determine whether,
if the impairment's effects were currently manifested, the
likely would prevail on the merits of his FRA claim of discrimination based
upon handicap. Id- at 424.
124. Id. at 419.
125. Id-
126. See supra Part M. B. 1.
127. Arguably, school officials treated the plaintiff as restricted in compari-
son to most people as to the conditions under which he could participate in
high school sports. This treatment brings the plaintiff under the ADA's "re-
garded as" test. There is nothing in the decision, however, to indicate that the
court conducted this type of analysis.
128. See supra note 10.
129. Legislative history indicates that Congress intended this test to cover
individuals who have recovered from some substantially limiting impairment,
such as cancer or emotional illness. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
130. Id-
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claimed restriction would be considered a disability under the
"current" test.
Using the proposed analysis, a plaintiff must do more than
merely allege that she has a record of an impairment, even if
that impairment resulted in hospitalization.' 3 ' Admission to a
hospital does not inherently require a finding of disability. For
example, if a plaintiff claims that her documented case of
chronic depression establishes a sufficient record, a court fol-
lowing the proposed analysis must also require the plaintiff to
show that the depression at one time restricted the conditions,
manner, or duration of partaking in life activities as compared
to most people.132 A record of hospitalization could sufficiently
prove the disability, but only if the record produces evidence
which meets the proposed standard.1 an
3. The "Regarded As" Test
The definition's "regarded as" test requires a plaintiff to
show that a party covered by the ADA either perceives or
131. Applying the proposed standard to this test brings up the Supreme
Court's holding in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273
(1987), to wit, that hospitalization is sufficient to establish a handicap under
this prong. Id at 281. Under the proposal in this Note, the Supreme Court's
holding can be reconciled with the ADA's definition of disability only if the
hospitalization resulting from the impairment substantially limited one of the
plaintiff's major life activities (i.e., the hospitalization restricted the duration,
manner, or conditions under which the person partook in a major life activity,
in comparison to most people).
132. Mental illnesses rarely have been litigated under the FRA. As mental
illnesses achieve increased legitimacy, plaintiffs increasingly may use records
of such impairments to gain protection under the ADA, especially as people
begin to receive effective treatment for mental illness, thereby enabling them
to prevent the illness from manifesting itself. The absence of current manifes-
tations likely will remove the "current" test from consideration, place the lo-
cus on any past manifestations and trigger the records of mental illness as
potential proof of disability. See generally D. Larson, Mental Impairments
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 48 LA. L. REv. 841 (1988) (examining
whether an asserted mental disorder should be regarded as a statutory impair-
ment for purposes of the FRA).
The impetus to recognize the effects of mental illness should not blind
courts to the fact that reliable standards are needed for deciding whether a
given mental illness results in a disability. If courts do not follow established
standards, their efforts may sacrifice the remedial purposes behind the ADA.
133. For any court deciding whether a record of admission establishes a
disability, the duration and circumstances of the admission are extremely rele-
vant factors. For example, short-term hospitalization for observation may not
result in a record of a substantial limitation, but long-term hospitalization in
intensive care for a heart attack or cancer most likely would.
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treats her as being so limited 3 4 The impaired person must
show that she was treated as if she was substantially limited,
perceived to be so limited, or is so limited only as a result of
perception, ignorance or prejudice.'i In other words, the plain-
tiff must prove that a covered entity's perceptions or treatment
resulted in a restriction severe enough to be considered a sub-
stantially limiting impairment under the "current" test.
Although the focus of the "regarded as" test differs from
the other tests, 36 the proposed analysis may be effectively ap-
plied. In fact, the analysis will more forcefilly ground the test
in the purposes behind its creation. 37 Further, it will provide a
more stable foundation for deciding cases under the "regarded
as" test. Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Center,13s decided under
the FRA, is an example of a decision in which the proposed
analysis can better explain the result. In Kohl, a child with
hepatitis was denied access to public learning programs. The
court found that the child was handicapped under the "re-
garded as" test. 3 9 In addition, although holding that the hepa-
titis did not physically impair the child, 40  the court
nevertheless found him handicapped under the "current" and
"record of" tests of the FRA's definition.' 4 '
134. ADA, supra note 1, § 3(2)(C).
135. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iv) (1989).
136. The. "regarded as" test focuses on the perceptions of the covered en-
tity, not on those of the impaired person. See supra note 32 and accompanying
text. It is curious that in the Department of Health, Education & Welfare reg-
ulations analyzing "regarded as having such an impairment," the word "such"
is deleted from the regulations, leaving only "regarded as having an impair-
ment." 45 C.F.R., § 84.3(j)(2)(iv) (1989). Given the connection between all
three subsections, it is perhaps error to assume that one can be found handi-
capped under the "regarded as" test without a showing that the resulting im-
pairment substantially limited a major life activity. But see Comment,
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, supra note 22, at 676 (stating that "Congress ex-
pressly excluded the term substantial from consideration in any case where
the individual has been regarded as having an impairment") (emphasis added).
137. Congress enacted the ADA to provide protection to individuals who
have restricting impairments. The "regarded as" test was designed to address
restrictions that exist because of other people's perceptions, prejudices, and ig-
norance. The ADA covers both de facto and de jure restrictions, but that does
not mean that the ADA should cover impaired individuals regardless of any
actual or perceived restriction. See supra note 32 (discussing, inter alia, the
statements in relevant legislative history about the ADA definition's "re-
garded as" test).
138. 672 F. Supp. 1226 (W.D. Mo.), rev'd on other grounds, 865 F.2d 930 (8th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 239 (1989).
139. Id. at 1236.
140. 1d. at 1234.
141. Id. at 1236.
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The Kohl court's second finding is illogical. If the plaintiff
was not physically impaired by the hepatitis,14 the court could
not logically conclude that the plaintiff nonetheless was sub-
stantially limited under the "current" and "record of" tests.143
Such a holding demonstrates that the Kohl court failed to ana-
lyze the severity of the effects that the hepatitis had on the
plaintiff.
Moreover, although the court found that the plaintiff was
handicapped under the "regarded as" test, it provided little
analysis in its opinion.144 The analysis proposed in this Note,
however, can better explain the decision. Applying this Note's
analysis, the plaintiff child would fall under the definition's
"regarded as" test if he were denied access to a learning pro-
gram or isolated from all other students as a result of officials'
inaccurate belief that his hepatitis was contagious. If this were
the case, school officials' beliefs about the impairment would
have restricted the conditions under which he would "learn' 45
compared to the majority of students without hepatitis, thereby
substantially limiting him in the activity of learning.
C. PROPOSED ANALYSIS AND THE MAJOR LIE ACTIvITY OF
WORKING
The proposed analysis will be most useful for courts decid-
ing whether a given impairment results in a substantial limita-
tion on the individual's major life activity of "working."'146 In
142. Id at 1234.
143. See supra text accompanying note 32 (discussing the "regarded as"
test). For a glimpse into the Supreme Court's view of handicaps based on the
"regarded as" test, see School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,
282-84 (1987). Applying the proposed analysis, a child who has infectious hepa-
titis but is asymptomatic would not fall under the definition's first test, as the
hepatitis would not currently affect the duration, conditions, or manner of
participation in any major life activity. Nor would the disease result in cover-
age under the second test, as there would be no record of such limitation.
144. The court reasoned that Kohl was handicapped under the FRA be-
cause officials believed that his hepatitis posed a threat to other persons within
the school, and that this belief was the basis for denying Kohl admission.
Kohl, 672 F. Supp. at 1236. The court concluded that Kohl's ability to learn
and work was "substantially limited" as a result of officials' attitudes. Id The
unanswered question is how the denial to one facility would so restrict Kohl's
learning and working activities so as to constitute a substantial limitation.
145. Most students are educated together with other students. At the least,
the inability to interact with other students would certainly restrict the man-
ner under which the infected student would develop social skills. Although no
court has specifically decided a case such as this, these skills are also
"learning."
146. Working is perhaps the most problematic life activity because only
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employment cases, courts are now likely to use the analysis
found in E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall.147 In Black, the court
held that a person was substantially limited in the major life
activity of working if that person's impairment generally dis-
qualified him from a given category of employment.-48
The Black court concluded that a person is substantially
limited in working if that person's impairments result in an in-
ability to work in a certain category of jobs. The focus on a cat-
egory of jobs shifts attention away from the purpose of the
ADA - placing disabled persons on an equal footing with non-
disabled persons generally, not for specific occupations.
Courts using this Note's proposed analysis will decide
whether a person is substantially limited in working in a man-
ner more consistent with the purposes of the ADA than the
rule in Black. The legislative history of the ADA suggests that
courts should focus on the effects of an impairment on an indi-
vidual's ability to partake in life activities. 149 Thus, when con-
sidering the major life activity of working, courts should not
assume that the life activity of working is as narrow as one oc-
plaintiffs who do not qualify under any of the other life activities likely will
use it. For example, if a person with obesity shows that she is substantially
limited in walking or breathing, the court will find her disabled regardless of
any restrictions the impairment places on her ability to work. It is only if she
is not so limited in walking that she may focus on her ability to work.
Congress did not specifically define "working" in either the FRA or ADA
nor has any agency acting pursuant to congressional authority defined it.
Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 775 F.2d 1244, 1248 n.2 (6th Cir. 1985).
Additionally, only one federal agency has stated a concept helpful for defining
"working" for purposes of the ADA. The Department of Labor issued guide-
lines pursuant to § 503 of the FRA, which mandate that federal agencies de-
velop affirmative action plans for employing handicapped people. 29 U.S.C.
§ 793(a) (1988). In those guidelines, "substantially limited" is defined as the
ability to "secure, retain, and advance in employment." 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2
app. A (1990). Although that definition of "substantially limited" is not appli-
cable to other life activities, it could be applied to "working" as a life activity.
This applicability, however, has not been utilized. Courts rarely have referred
to this definition of substantially limited when interpreting § 504 of the FRA,
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988), the provision applicable to employment discrimination
and on which the ADA is based. See de la Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134, 1136
(5th Cir. 1986) (discussing how courts dealing with discrimination claims are
not bound by these guidelines); E.E. Black, Ltd., v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088,
1091 (D. Haw. 1980).
147. 497 F. Supp. at 1088. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
148. 497 F. Supp. at 1099. Later courts deciding the issue under the FRA
have followed the Black rule. See supra notes 90-91, 94 (discussing Black's
progeny).
149. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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cupational category.150 The Black rule improperly focused on
restrictions an impairment places on a person's ability to per-
form certain tasks that are part of some specific occupation, as
opposed to part of the general activity of working.15' Unlike
the Black rule, the proposed analysis encourages courts to con-
sider the severity of an impairment's effects on an individual's
ability to perform the general activity of working. The major
life activity of working includes more than specific duties con-
tained in any given job description. Like walking and perform-
ing manual tasks, working involves tasks, goals and duties that
must be performed regardless of the specific occupation that a
person holds.152
150. Moreover, legislative history suggests that a person could be found dis-
abled under the ADA even though that person was rejected from only one job.
H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 32, at 29 (person with severe allergy to paint,
which results in seizures, could be substantially limited in activity of working).
The proposed analysis can most effectively explain the committee's example.
Applying the analysis, the painter is not substantially limited in working if the
effects of the mild allergy are such that the duration, conditions, and manner
under which the mildly allergic painter can work are not so restricted in rela-
tion to the majority of painters who do not have the allergy. Alternatively,
the seizures and sores suffered by the painter with the severe allergy would
prevent him from working with the paint at all, thereby severely restricting
the conditions under which he could work compared with people who are not
allergic to the paint. Thus, he would be substantially limited in his ability to
work.
If one applies something other than an effects-based standard to distin-
guish the two scenarios, as for example the Black rule, supra text accompany-
ing note 85, Congress's reasoning seems inconsistent. The presence of a paint
peculiar to a certain job site does not limit the severely allergic painter any
more than the mildly allergic painter, if that paint is not generally used in the
area in which the painter could work. If this were so, both painters could ap-
ply for work at any other site that does not use that paint. Thus, the commit-
tee's example is reasonable only if the focus is on the impairment's effects on
one's ability to work.
151. The Black court stated that it would eviscerate the FRA to demand
complete unemployability in order to prove substantially limited in the major
life activity of working. 497 F. Supp. at 1099. Neither did the court accept the
proposition that a plaintiff could show she was substantially limited in the ma-
jor life activity of working by a failure to obtain one job. This would cause the
FRA to go beyond its purposes and any reasonable definition of "substantial."
Id.
152. There is no reason why a plaintiff should have to be rejected from
more than one job in order to seek protection under the ADA. Although the
Black court was correct in stating that Congress meant something by using the
word substantially, see supra text accompanying note 77, it does not follow
that Congress intended "substantially limited in the major life activity of
working" to mean disqualification from a category of jobs. This is especially so
if that conclusion required an impaired person to face the trauma of multiple
rejections before qualifying under the ADA. Every other major life activity
focuses on the ability of impaired individuals to participate in major life activi-
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Under the proposed analysis, if an impairment restricts the
manner, duration, or conditions under which an individual can
partake in the activity of workiss in comparison to the majority
of people, then the court should consider the individual sub-
stantially limited in the major life activity of working. Ob-
taining protection under the ADA thus does not depend on how
many jobs the person has been denied or on how many employ-
ers have rejected her.i 54
The Santiago v. Temple University-,s facts illustrate how
the proposed analysis improves the current law. Santiago was
virtually blind in one eye.1 ss He also suffered chronic and re-
curring eye inflammation, which mandated that he remain at
home until the inflammation could be reduced.' 57 The court
found that he was not handicapped under the FRA,'i 8 but did
not indicate any specific reason for ruling as it did. If the court
had followed the Black rule, it most likely would have con-
cluded that Santiago was not disabled. His impairment had re-
ties compared to the performance of that activity by non-impaired persons.
The proposed analysis in this Note maintains a consistent standard of proof.
153. This Note proposes that when "working" is the major life activity at
issue, "working" should be analyzed at the same level of generality as the
other enumerated major life activities and should be composed of such factors
as a person's ability to perform on a regular basis, learn new skills, and ad-
vance in skill and position if the person desires. This view is akin to the De-
partment of Labor's definition in 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1990). Working is not
defined in the texts of the ADA or FRA, but the above conception is most sim-
ilar to the levels of generality that the other major life activities establish. In
addition, although the general essence of walking or hearing may be easier to
grasp than that of working or even taking care of oneself, the essence of work-
ing is as general. The foregoing description of working respects this
conception.
154. It is possible that the Black rule, supra text accompanying note 85,
may not be functionally different from the approach advocated in this Note.
Recurring eye infections could result in an inability to regularly attend work.
As with the applicant in Black, a person with such a condition would most
likely be disqualified from employment in his chosen field. The essential dif-
ference between the two approaches is that the Black rule focuses on the spe-
cific occupation. This approach is difficult to square with Congress's intent
that "substantially" be measured in reference to most people, not most occupa-
tions. The two approaches to "working" might be reconciled, however, if the
majority standard in the proposed analysis compares the alleged restriction's
severity to restrictions suffered by the majority of unimpaired people in a
given occupation within a given field.
155. 739 F. Supp. 974 (E.D. Pa. 1990). For a more detailed discussion of the
holding in Santiago, see supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
156. 739 F. Supp. at 977.
157. I&
158. Id. at 978.
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sulted in removal from only one job, and he did not show that
his impairment disqualified him from any specific occupation.
Under the proposed analysis, the court should have found
Santiago disabled. Regardless of any occupational qualifica-
tions, regular attendance at work is part of the major life activ-
ity of working for the majority of employed people. Regardless
of his specific job and the tasks associated with that job, Santi-
ago was unable to attend work on a regular basis. In reality
then, the impairment restricted the duration and conditions
under which he could work. Santiago's inability to attend work
on a regular basis resulted in a substantial limitation on the ac-
tivity of working. Therefore, a court applying the proposed
analysis would consider Santiago to be a member of the ADA's
protected class. Contrary to the Black rule, but consistent with
the purposes of the ADA, the court could find Santiago dis-
abled regardless of any proof that the impairment restricted his
ability to work in a given occupation.
CONCLUSION
The ADA will have a tremendous impact on the ways in
which American society encounters and relates to disabled per-
sons.159 The importance of the legislation necessitates careful
consideration of who the legislation protects1 6° The language
of the ADA is ambiguous as to the breadth of the protected
class, and existing federal law provides insufficient guidance on
this issue. As a result, courts faced with applying the ADA
need a reliable method for reaching conclusions on who is
disabled.
This Note suggests a systematic method for courts to use in
determining whether a plaintiff is disabled under the ADA.
159. The ADA should be its own statute, and not merely a continuation of
the FRA. Although courts can examine decisions under the FRA for guidance
in making determinations about coverage, they should feel free to ignore hold-
ings that seem ill-founded or clothed in mystery. The ADA's legislative his-
tory provides courts with new points of focus for determining when an
impairment is substantially limiting and therefore disabling. By pursuing
those points, courts can assure that the ADA is not a de facto amendment of
the FRA, and that the ADA's broad and just purposes are fulfilled.
160. The proposed analysis can help develop a uniform approach to judicial
determinations of disability, thereby aiding in the growth of decisional law re-
garding disability. Finally, the proposal will contribute to the conversation
among scholars, advocates, and citizens concerning the status of disability law
in the United States. This conversation will both aid in the elimination of dis-
crimination on the basis of disability and facilitate equitable integration of dis-
abled persons into American society.
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The method consists of a proposed standard of severity and
three different measures of restriction. Using the majority of
people as the standard for gauging the severity of any restric-
tions resulting from an impairment provides a reliable standard
consistent with society's notion of disabilities. In addition, ex-
amining the manner, duration and conditions under which an
individual can partake in a given activity will ensure that courts
consistently focus on the multiple and diverse effects that can
result from an impairment - effects that limit a person's abil-
ity to live without significant restrictions.
James M. Zappa

